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T
he paper proposes a generalized model of hazard systems. It seeks to demonstrate the
underlyingcommonality of the elements and structureswhich make up hazard systems,
and to render explicit certain concepts which are implicit in earlier models.
The model comprises a source with a potential to emit harmful energy or matter or some
combination of the two, and one or more receptors which may be affected by such harmful
emissions. It takes account of the fact that an inanimate receptor may itself, on absorbing
energy, then become a source.
Except where the source and the receptor are in direct contact, the model provides for one or
more successive transmission paths which are carriers of the harmful emission from source to
receptor(s). It also provides for the presence of barriers. The emission, which may be quanti® ed
at any point in the system by the integral of its ¯ ux (intensity) with respect to time, may be
attenuated by the transmitting medium, and/or by barriers. This, after taking account of the
relevant impact area of the receptor (typically the projected area), yields the dose incident upon
the receptor(s). The prediction of harm from this dose requires the incorporationof a transform,
denoted in the paper by TD ! H , which cannot be expressed in purely physical terms but which
is derived from observation or from experiment. This provides a probabilistic relationship
between the level of incident dose and the level of harm in¯ icted.
The paper subjects the purely physical elements of such hazard systems to dimensional
analysis. It demonstrates how, in some cases, emissions are quanti® ed in practice by indices
with dimensions which differ from those of an integral of a ¯ ux with time.
Though the model is conceived as a perfectly general one which is not limited by the nature
of the hazard or by the time-scale of the events, the authors claim that it can be applied with
particular relevance to the potentially harmful acute emissions of energy or of matter, or of
both in combination, which occur from time to time in the process industries.
Based upon the above concepts, and using existing methodologies for the estimation of the
frequency with which the potential of a source may be realized, algorithms are proposed for
calculating individual risk and its derivative, societal risk.
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THE CONCEPT OF HAZARD
A number of de® nitionsof `hazard’ have been proposed. For
example, a Study Group of the Royal Society1 has given the
following:
`A situation that in particular circumstances could lead to
harm, where harm is the loss to a human being (or to a
human population) consequent on damage, and damage is
the loss of inherent quality suffered by an entity (physical or
biological)’ .
The Advisory Committee on Major Hazards2 and Jones3
have de® ned hazard as follows:
`A physical situation with a potential for human injury,
damage to property, damage to the environment or some
combination of these’ .
HAZARD SYSTEMS
Neither of the above de® nitions makes an explicit
reference to the means by which the harm is transmitted
from a source to a receptor.
Based upon, and extending, the above de® nitions, the
present authors have evolved the following de® nition of a
`hazard system’ in which the concepts of means of
transmission, and of possible attenuation of the energy or
matter transmitted, are made explicit:
`A system which, in its most general form, comprises four
elements, (1) a source, which has the potential for emitting
harmful energy and/or matter, (2) receptors, which have the
potential for being harmed by the absorption of such
emissions, (3) transmission paths [The term `transmission
path’ is meant here to incorporate the meanings both of a
route, and where appropriate, of a medium, such as the
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atmosphere. An alternative term `vector’ (Latin for
`carrier’ ), which has some advantages, has been rejected
because of its rather speci® c usage in engineering.], which
carry or transmit the harmful emission from source to
receptor and may simultaneously attenuate it, and (4)
barriers, which also have the potential to attenuate the
emission.Where the source and the receptor are in immediate
contact, transmission paths or barriers are absent. [We
designate this tentatively a `passive hazard system’ (the
alternative `direct. . .’ has been suggested).]’
This model of a hazard system is illustrated in Figure 1.
S1 denotes a primary source. R1 is a receptor in direct
contact with S1 which does not require a transmission path
to receive harm and has no barrier. Transmission path 1
carries the emission from S1 to R2 via a barrier and
attenuates it en route. Transmission path 2 carries harm
from S1 to receptor R3 which then becomes a secondary
source, S2, from which transmission path 3 carries the
emission to receptor R4. [It should be mentioned that an
alternative type of secondary source may be created by the
accumulation of hazardous matter released from a primary
source. Examples are a ¯ ammable liquid collected in a bund
and a ¯ ammable vapour cloud resulting from the ¯ ashing of
a lique® ed vapour. In order to avoid congestion, the authors
have resisted the temptation to incorporate a representation
of such phenomena in Figure 1.]
HAZARD SYSTEMS OF THE PROCESS
INDUSTRIES
Hazard systems occur in nature and in all walks of life.
They might be classi® ed as follows: natural, domestic,
industrial, commercial, transport, recreation, medical (some
of these categories may overlap).
Industry may be divided for convenience into several
categories: service, extractive and manufacturing, and the
manufacturing industries may be further subdivided into
utilities, fabrication industries and process industries. It is
with the hazard systems of the process industries that this
paper is concerned.
These latter, de® ned for the present purpose as those
manufacturing industries whose products are sold by mass
or by volume, and typi® ed by the chemical and petroleum
re® ning industries, confer enormous bene® ts on mankind.
These bene® ts may, however, be offset in part by
disadvantages associated with the presence of hazard
systems comprising the potential for unwanted emissions
of energy or of matter, or both, which may cause injury or
loss of life, damage to property or to the environment, or
some combination of these.
These emissions may be considered as falling into two
basic categoriesÐ chronic (long-term) emissions of low
intensity, and acute (short-term) emissions of high intensity.
The harmful effects produced in hazard systems involving
chronic emissions are, at least in principle, capable of being
anticipated and of being reduced by design to a socially
acceptable level. The study of the design methodologies
required to do this, though of great importance, does not
form part of the subject matter of this paper.
The paper is concerned rather with acute process hazard
systems which, especially when on a large scale, form the
subject of great public apprehension. The realizations of
such acute hazards, which may be regarded as being pulses
of energy or matter, are essentially stochastic in nature and
hence their prediction must involve the laws of probability.
Considerable attention has been devoted during the last
three decades to the study of such large-scale acute events,
which are sometimes referred to as `major hazards’ or
`major accident hazards’ . They are discussed in, for
example, ACMH2 ,4 ,5 , King6 , Lees7 and Marshall8 . The
European Union has initiated a substantial body of
legislation in the area, exempli® ed in the UK by Reference
9. Though much success has been achieved, the problem, to
judge from the persistence of such occurrences, cannot be
claimed to have been totally solved.
MODELLING ACUTE HAZARDS
There have been previous attempts to model hazard
systems, for example Eisenberg et al.1 0 , HSE1 1 , Poblete et
al.1 2 and Lees et al.1 3 . Also, the elements of which the
proposed model of a hazard system is constituted are set out
and discussed in Jones3 . However, in the present authors’
view, though these were important steps forward, they did
not provide a comprehensive concept such as the present
paper aims to propound.
HARMFUL EMISSIONS
The emissions under consideration are very diverse and
not easily classi® ed. They generally involvematerials which
are capable of causing harm by virtue of their intrinsic
chemical properties and/or of their thermodynamic state.
Their harmful effects may derive principally from ¯ ows of
material or of energy, though these are often interdependent.
A tentative taxonomy is suggested in Tables 1 and 2.
Some hazard systems involve biologically active materi-
als. These are becoming increasingly important in the
process industries, but they have special properties arising
from the ability of living organisms to replicate. On this
account such systems require modi® cations to the model
presented here and are not further discussed.
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Figure 1. The hazard system.
REALIZATIONS OF SOURCES
The de® nition of a hazard system set out above contains the
concept of potential. A realization is an event, or series of
events, by which what is potential for harm in a source
becomes real, in whole or in part.
The series of events which constitutes a realization may
include several phases. For example, there may be an
emission of pressure energy followed by an emission of
matter followed by an emission of radiation (heat). Such
series of events have been modelled, for example, by
Wells1 4 .
An important circumstance is one in which a receptor in
one system, on receipt of energy from a source, itself
becomes the source for a second hazard system. This
process may then be repeated, as happens, for example, in
explosions and major con¯ agrations.
ACUTE EMISSIONS
An acute emission may be regarded as a pulse of energy or
matter which, at any point in its path, has a beginning and an
end in time. The time interval between the two is its duration.
Such an emission may be more or less symmetrically
distributed in space around a source, at least in a horizontal
plane, as for example one arising from an explosion, or it
may be highly directional, as in a jet ® re. This topic is
developed below in the context of the discussion of
attenuation.
Emissions may be quanti® ed at any point in their path by
the integral, with time, of their intensity, as de® ned below.
DIMENSIONAL ANALYSIS
For emissions of energy, the intensity is their energy
¯ ux, i.e. energy per unit time (power), per unit area normal
to the direction of ¯ ow, with dimensionsML2T- 3 ´L- 2 (or
MT- 3 ). The integral with time, which quanti® es the pulse,
has dimensions of MT- 3 ´T (or MT- 2 ), i.e. energy per unit
area.
For emissions of matter the intensity is their mass ¯ ux,
i.e. mass ¯ ow rate (of a speci® ed substance) per unit area
normal to the direction of ¯ ow, with dimensions MT- 1L- 2 .
The integral with time, which quanti® es the pulse, has the
dimensionsML- 2 , i.e. mass per unit area.
If a pulse is propagated at a constant velocity then
the duration of the pulse along its path is constant.
Though this is not necessarily true, as for example in the
case of vapour releases, it will simplify the discussion to
assume that the duration of a pulse is approximately
constant.
TRANSMISSION PATHS
Though emissions may be transmitted by more than
one path in parallel, to simplify the discussion it will
be assumed that only one path is operational between
any two points. Table 3 lists the transmission paths that
are most commonly encountered in the process industries.
Radiation is propagated in free space according to
the well-known inverse square law. However, free space
does not exist in practical terms in process sites and
the propagation of radiation in such hazard systems is
modi® ed by the atmosphere which, under terrestrial
conditions, is the transmission path for radiation.
Shock waves are typically transmitted through the
atmosphere and are then known as `blast waves’ .
For vapour spillages (vapour clouds) the wind, and other
forms of atmospheric disturbance, are the transmission
mechanisms which determine the pathways.
Water may act as a transmission path if liquids or
solids are spilled. Such paths may be natural watercourses
or they may be sewers and storm drains. Liquids or solids
may sink, ¯ oat or dissolve.
The ground may transmit shock waves. Liquids spilled on
the ground may seep into it and travel considerable
distances.
Pipelines may transmit shock waves over distances of
many kilometres.
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Table 1. Harmful energy sources and the types of emission they may
generate.
Type of energy emission
Type of
energy Thermal Shock
source Kinetic radiation waves Noise
Chemical
explosive 3 3 3 3
Thermal 3
Pressure 3 3 3
Potential 3
Table 2. Harmful matter sources and the types of emission they may generate.
Type of matter emission
Type of
matter Gas Vapour Liquid Dust Solid
source* clouds clouds Mists spillages Clouds spillages
Gas 3
Lique® ed
vapour 3 3 3
Liquid 3
Solid 3 3
* The source, and consequently the emission, may exhibit one or more of the following attributes: explosibility, ¯ ammability, asphyxiancy,
ATTENUATION
The word `attenuation’, which is derived from the Latin,
means `to make thin’ . The mechanisms of attenuation vary
from one transmission path to another and from one barrier
to another.
In general the intensities of emissions are attenuated in
the course of transmission. Such an attenuation may be
quanti® ed by a dimensionless factor a T P , de® ned by
equation (1):
wd = wu(1 - a TP) (1)
where w u , w d are the ¯ uxes at the upstream and downstream
ends of the path respectively. a T P has a value between zero
and 1.0.
Attenuation may also occur through the intervention of
barriers and may then be quanti® ed by a similar factor, a B .
Barriers may be solid, as in shields against explosions, in
bunds which impede the ¯ ow of liquids, in some protective
clothing and in air-breathing apparatus, or they may be
semi-permeable as in the case of buildings which impede
the passage of toxic gases (this is also true of canister
respirators). There is a ® nite probability of failure in all
cases.
It may be worthwhile also to draw a distinction between
permanent barriers such as bunds and those which are only
activated in the event of an actual or incipient realization,
such as water or steam curtains, or emergency protective
clothing.
Attenuation of Radiation
Attenuation of non-coherent radiation, in free space and
with spherical geometry, is governed by the inverse square
law, which derives from the conservation of energy. It may
be appropriately described as `geometrical’ attenuation.
Actual radiation sources may depart markedly from
spherical geometry, being governed, for example, by
`view factors’ .
Attenuation of heat radiation in the atmosphere may also
be enhanced by meteorological conditions of less than total
transparency, causing the energy to be partly absorbed.
Attenuation of Shock Waves
In the `near ® eld’ of an explosion a number of energy
transformations occur. Outside of it the resultant energy is
manifested as a shock (blast) wave. The attenuation of shock
waves is also governed, insofar as the atmosphere behaves
as a perfectly elastic medium, by an inverse square law.
The attenuation of shock waves in pipelines is a special
case. Pipelines act as wave guides and attenuation may not
conform with the inverse square law.
Attenuation of Vapour Clouds by Dilution
The attenuation of a vapour ¯ ux after spillage has been
intensively studied under the heading of `dispersion’ . This
study is a specialist branch of ¯ uid mechanics. The
attenuation process entails a progressive dilution of the
vapour in the course of transmission. Such factors as the
buoyancy of the vapour, the stability of the atmosphere and
the wind speed are signi® cant.
The transmission in such cases may give rise to a plume
which is not symmetrically distributed and whose orienta-
tion has to be predicted in stochastic terms. A factor must
then be devised which expresses attenuation in terms of
orientation as well as distance.
Attenuation of Spillages by Watercourses
This has some analogies with the attenuation of vapour
by the atmosphere. Attenuation by the ground depends
upon the permeability of the rocks through which the
liquid passes and the ability of the rock to adsorb it.
THE CONCEPT OF INCIDENT DOSE
The discussion above has been concerned with the
quanti® cation of an emission, whether of energy or
matter, at any point in its path. We must now consider the
quanti® cation of the impact of the emission on a receptor.
This involves the concept of incident dose.
Emissions have been quanti® ed above as the integral,
with time, of a ¯ ux which is a rate of ¯ ow (of energy or
matter) per unit area normal to the path. It would seem
therefore that the incident dose may be quanti® ed by
multiplying the time-integral of the product of this
emission and its attenuation factors by an appropriate
`impact area’ of the receptor (typically its projected area).
[It may be noted that Lees15 de® nes thermal dose in terms
of the thermal radiation intensity (a ¯ ux), excluding
the impact area of the receptor.] This ® nal product has
the dimensions of energy or mass as the case may be.
The receptor will not necessarily absorb the entire
incident dose of energy or matter as de® ned above. The
magnitude of the absorption fraction is not usually speci® ed
in the literature: it may be regarded as a component of
the relationship between incident dose and harm discussed
below.
EQUATIONS FOR INCIDENT DOSE
Based upon the discussion above, the following equations
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Table 3. Transmission paths.
Medium Transmission mechanism
Free space Radiation
The atmosphere Radiation Blast waves Vapour clouds
Watercourses Shock waves Liquid spillages Solid spillages
Pipelines Shock waves
The ground Shock waves Liquid spillages








for incident dose may now be put forward:
Energy DE = e
t1
t0









Matter DM = e
t1
t0









DE , DM are the incident doses of energy or matter, J or kg;
t0 is the time of arrival of the pulse, s;
t1 is the time when the intensity of the pulse becomes
negligible, s;
wE , wM are the ¯ uxes of energy or matter emitted by the
source, Wm± 2 or kg s± 1 m± 2 ;
a T P is the factor for attenuation due to transmission paths,
number;
a B is the factor for attenuation due to barriers, number;
Ai is the appropriate impact area of the receptor, m
2 .
It may be noted that in equations (2) and (3) the
attenuation factors have been included under the integral
signs. This is strictly necessary only if they are time-
dependent, which may or may not be the case. However, the
form of presentation used above seems to the authors to
have the merit of transparency.
THE INCIDENT DOSE/HARM RELATIONSHIP
The dose falling upon a receptor can, as discussed above,
be quanti® ed in purely physical terms. The prediction of the
level of harm which a given incident dose will in¯ ict upon a
receptor presents two interrelated dif® culties: that of
quantifying harm in often complex structures and especially
in animate receptors, where it cannot be expressed solely in
terms of physical parameters; and that of relating harm to
incident dose for processes that are, as we have said,
essentially stochastic in nature.
The ® rst problem is commonly addressed by the
statistical device of representing harm by a quantal, which
is a binary (`all-or-nothing’ ) response characterized by a
syndrome (a set of symptoms which run together). A much-
used quantal is death, because it is both intrinsically
important and relatively unambiguous.
The second problem may be characterized symbolically
as follows:
DM orDE ¡ ¡ !TD ! H Q
where:
TD ! H is a dose-to-harm transform (an operator);
Q is the fraction of the population of receptors sustaining
harm as de® ned by a speci® ed quantal.
The transform TD ! H cannot generally be expressed as a
mathematical function: it represents a statistical relationship
which may take different forms according to the type of
hazard system being considered and the nature of the
available data.
For particular agents, the transform TD ! H may be
represented by `tables of correspondences’ , in which
incident dose and harm are related. Such tables may be
derived from observation or from experiment. Experiment
on human subjects can of course only be conducted at low
levels of harm. For higher levels, animal experiments are
used. Data for humans may also be obtained by studying the
effects of accidents, though the incident dose is then usually
not directly known but has to be inferred from such evidence
as may be available. Tables of correspondences have no
rules for interpolation and are necessarily approximate.
A more re® ned transform is derived by the well-known
procedure of probit analysis (vide Finney1 6 ). This leads to
a relationship of the form:
Pr = a + b logn incident dose (4)
where Pr (sometimes expressed as Y) represents the probit,
expressed in numbers of standard deviations, and a, b are
empirically determined coef® cients characteristic of particular
agents.
Values of the coef® cients a and b for a number of agents are
quoted in the literature (see, e.g., IChemE1 7 ). Tables relating
probit and percentage probability (equivalent to 100 times the
fraction Q) are given in standard textbooks on biological
statistics (e.g., Finney1 6 ). Alternatively, the probit may be
plotted on log-probability paper, giving a percentage scale.
As discussed below, incident dose may be expressed in
the literature as an `index’ or as a `quasi-dose’ (or as an
index of a quasi-dose). A probit analysis can be applied
equally well to any of these measures of dose (vide
Eisenberg et al.1 0 ).
The probit approach has limitations (Marshall1 8 ). Never-
theless, where data exist it provides the most informative,
and at the same time the most accurate, means for predicting
response.
SURROGATES FOR FLUX
The doses of energy from blast waves and of matter from
material emissions are not usually expressed in the literature
in the terms used above. Rather, they are represented by
various surrogate parameters having dimensions different
from those of the respective ¯ uxes. We shall call these
`indices’ .
An Index of the Flux of Blast Energy
In the literature the emission of blast energy is typically
quanti® ed, not as an energy ¯ ux (i.e. energy per unit time
per unit area [MT± 3 ]) but as a peak side-on overpressure
(referred to below as `peak over-pressure’ ), i.e. as a force
per unit area [MLT ± 2 ´L± 2 or ML± 1T ± 2 ]. It is implicitly
assumed that the variation of overpressure with time (a
sharp rise followed by a slower decay) is always governed
by an equation of the same form. Furthermore, there is a
dimensional discrepancy of a factor having the dimensions
of a velocity (LT ± 1 ) implying, perhaps, that only pressure
waves havinga common propagationvelocityare considered.
When the index is expressed in the literature as impulse,
which is a product (strictly, the integral) of peak over-
pressure with duration [time], the dimension of time is
included. The element of length is still absent, however.
This would suggest that the index is appropriate only for
correlating the effects of emissions having a common
positive-phase wavelength. This index also disregards the
impact area of the receptor and is therefore strictly
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applicable only to sets of receptors having a common value
of that parameter.
To calculate the index of incident dose for blast, equation
(2) may thus be modi® ed as follows:
DEI =Pmax ´(1 - a TP)´(1 - a B)
(based on peak overpressure) (5)
or
DEI =Pmax ´ h ´(1 - a TP)´(1 - a B)
(based on impulse) (6)
where Pm a x is the peak overpressure at the source and h is
the duration of the positive phase.
Because overpressure is readily measured when deter-
mining the effects of experimental explosions, such results
are extensively quoted in tables of correspondences, as for
example in IChemE1 9 . For dense explosions of military
signi® cance, peak overpressure has been shown to provide a
rough correlation with injury and damage. However,
overpressures from vapour-cloud explosions, which have
much longer wavelengths than those from dense explosives,
do not correlate so well with harm.
There are extensive published data on the attenuation of
overpressure with distance. The data are correlated by
Hopkinson’s Scaling Law2 0 which, in its scienti® cally
correct form, states that similar physical effects subsist for
equal values of the ratio of the distance from an explosion to
the cube root of the energy released. [The latter factor is
often substituted by the cube root of an equivalent mass of
TNT, which, though convenient, is clearly incorrect
dimensionally].
An Index of the Flux of Emitted Matter
The universally used index of a material ¯ ux is the mass
concentration of the speci® ed substance. This has the
dimensionsML± 3 , which differ from those of mass ¯ ux by a
factor with dimensions LT± 1 (i.e., those of velocity). The
incident dose is then represented by the integral (or product)
of concentration with time, whose dimensions differ from
those of dose as de® ned above by a factor with dimensions
L3T ± 1 (equivalent to a volumetric ¯ ow rate).




CM ´(1 - a TP)´(1 - a B)[ ]dt (7)
where CM is the mass concentration of the speci® ed
substance at the point of emission.
The adoption of this index obviates the need to use a
projected area for inhaled toxics (this would be the area of
the breathing zone of the receptor). The index is then used to
predict response, using probits, where these exist, or through
tables of correspondences. There are extensive published
data of this character relating to common toxics.
The incident dose, expressed as mass (dimensionM) may
be evaluated by multiplying the integral of the attenuated
concentration with time (dimensions ML± 3T) by the
respiration rate of the receptor, which has the dimensions
L3T ± 1 .
THE CONCEPT OF THE QUASI-DOSE
In the discussion above it has been assumed that harm can
be correlated with incident dose, which is a product of an
attenuated mean ¯ ow of energy or matter and a duration. In
relation at least to toxic emissions it was at one time the
common view that, so far as the capability of in¯ icting a
given level of harm was concerned, for a given projected
area, mean ¯ ux (or concentration) and duration were
inversely related (this is known as `Haber’ s Rule’ ).
However, recent work has shown that there are notable
exceptions to this rule and that, in these cases, harm
correlates better with the time integral of a quantity equal to
the ¯ ux raised to a power n, where the value of n is
characteristic of the agent. In the case of a ¯ ux of matter, its
index, the mass concentration, has to be raised to the power
n.
The present authors term such doses `quasi-doses’ [Latin
quasi= `as if’ ]. [Lees15 uses the term `load’ to represent the
product of duration and the nth power of the incident ¯ ux.]
The phenomenon has been accepted by investigators as an
empirical fact, but satisfactory explanations of it have not
yet been forthcoming.
Thus, in such cases, equations (2) and (7) must be














CM ´(1 - a TP)´(1 - a B)[ ]ndt (9)
where:
DE Q is incident quasi-dose of energy;
DM IQ is quasi-index of incident dose of matter;
CM is mass concentration;
n is an exponent $ 1.0.
A major example of a quasi-dose is thermal radiation, for
which, in equation (8), n has a value of approximately 4/3
(Eisenberg et al.1 0 ). Examples of toxic agents to which
quasi-doses apply are ammonia and chlorine, for which, in
equation (9), n approximates to 2 (Payne et al..2 1 , Turner
and Fairhurst2 2 ), and hydrogen sulphide, for which n
approximates to 4 (Turner and Fairhurst2 3 ).
INDIVIDUAL RISK
Jones3 has de® ned `individual risk’ as `the frequency at
which an individualmay be expected to sustain a given level
of harm from the realization of speci® ed hazards’ .
On any process site, it is likely that any receptor will be a
receptor in a number of systems in which the sources are
process hazards. For simplicity of discussion, however, it
will be initially assumed that the hazard system being
considered has only one source.
In the general case, realizations fall upon a spectrum
ranging from a minor event to some maximum event. A
method for establishing individual risk, therefore, is to
divide up this spectrum into segments and to estimate, for
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any segment, a mean level L of emission. It is next necessary
to calculate the consequent dose incident to a receptor i,
using the appropriate equation as set out in Table 5.
This is followed by estimating the fraction Qi L corre-
sponding to the incident dose by means of the TD ! H
transform. Where a probit relationship does not exist,
judgement must be exercised to obtain an estimate of the
fractional mortality from a table of correspondences. The
dif® culties involved in doing this are considerable and
emphasize the approximate nature of the values of
individual risk so calculated.
The next step is to establish the frequency fL with which
such emissions may occur within any such segment. It is not
part of the purpose of this paper to set out the methodologies
which exist for estimating the frequencies of these
emissions: these are discussed in works such as Pitblado
and Turney2 4 .
For each segment, the corresponding individual risk is
obtained as the product of the quantal fraction and the
frequency. The total individual risk is then estimated by
summing the products of quantal fraction and frequency for
all segments.




[QiL ´ fL] (10)
As indicated above, a receptor may form part of several
overlapping hazard systems, including those from second-
ary sources which may be realized from a primary source.
The total individual risk associated with a process is
obtained by summing the individual risks from all the
process sources. This is discussed in Reference 11.
SOCIETAL RISK
Jones3 has de® ned `societal risk’ as `the relationship
between the frequency and the number of people suffering a
speci® ed level of harm from the realization of speci® ed
hazards’ .
The calculation of societal risk in the neighbourhoodof a
process hazard requires the assumption of a typical
distribution and population density of receptors. Receptors
may be on-site or off-site. The distribution selected may
have to take account of hour-by-hour and day-by-day
variations in the number and distribution of receptors.
The discussion above on individual risk has demonstrated
how, for any level of realization, a quantal fraction Qi L may
be calculated for any given receptor. This quantity may be
viewed alternatively as an equivalent fractional number
(1´Qi L ) of casualties in terms of the speci® ed quantal for
each receptor. These fractional numbers may then be
summed to give a total number of quantal responses,
denoted here by NL , for the whole population. Such a value
will typically not be an integer.
Thus the calculation of societal risk requires, for a given
level of realization, the estimation of the fraction QiL for
each receptor, as set out above for individual risk, and the
summation of these values over the whole population of
receptors to give an N value for this level.






Qi L = fractional response corresponding to the TD ! H trans-
form for the ith receptor at the given level of emission;
NL = total number of persons suffering harm in terms of the
speci® ed quantal by a given level of emission in a
population P.
The NL values so calculated constitute, with the
corresponding frequencies fL , the co-ordinates of what
may be termed a `probabilistic f/N curve’ . Such a curve,
plotted over the spectrum of possible levels of realization,
resembles the histograms known as f/N diagrams, in which,
based upon the historical record, values of quantals, N,
expressed as integers, are plotted against frequency. In order
to `smooth out’ the effects of randomness in `real life’ ,
historical data are usually plotted on F/N diagrams, where
the upper-case F represents a cumulative frequency (i.e. of
N or more fatalities). Integral values of N correspond with
societal risk as de® ned by Jones3 .
As with individual risk in the vicinity of process
installations, a number of sources may present societal
risk and it is necessary to summate all the societal risks. An
example of this is given in Reference 11.
INDIVIDUAL RISK AND SOCIETAL RISK
COMPARED
Though individual risk may be presented as a single
number, i.e. as the product of frequency and fractional
probability of death, this is not possible with societal risk.
Societal risk must be expressed as a relationship between
the number of quantals arising and the frequencies
corresponding with them. This may be conveniently
expressed as a probabilistic f/N diagram.
STATIC SOURCES AND MOBILE SOURCES
In the discussion above the source is assumed to be static
in relation to the receptors. The special problems of
individual and societal risk arising from mobile sources
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Table 5. Summary of equations for incident dose.
Type of emission Equation No. Form n-value
Blast energy 5 Index (overpressure) 1
6 Index (impulse) 1
Thermal energy 8 Direct (quasi-) 4 /3
Some toxic agents 6 Index (concentration) 1
Some toxic agents 9 Index (concentration, quasi-) >1
are discussed in Reference 25. For a mobile source,
individual risk for those living along a route may be small
but societal risk may nevertheless be high.
FURTHER WORK
Work is currently in progress at the University of
Bradford on validating the above model by using it to
analyse case histories of acute emissions listed in the
MHIDAS Index2 6 . Its more general validity could be
explored by applying it to acute hazards not discussed
above, such as those arising from ionizing radiation. It could
also be tested against chronic hazards such as those arising
from toxic substances, noise or vibration.
There is clearly a need for a readily available compen-
dium of probit relationships to facilitate the calculation of
individual and societal risks.
This work was motivated in part by the need to provide a
coherent framework for the teaching of process safety to
undergraduates in Chemical Engineering at the University
of Bradford, and in this it is proving extremely useful. Work
is now proceeding on the implications of the model for
managerial strategies for the control of acute process
hazards.
NOMENCLATURE
a, b coef® cients in probit regression, dimensionless
Ai impact area of receptor, m
2
CM mass concentration, kg m-
3
D dose: DE of energy (J), DM of matter (kg)
f frequency (point), s- 1
F frequency (cumulative), s- 1
n power to which ¯ ux must be raised for correlation with harm
(`quasi-dose’ )
N number of quantal responses (in societal risk), dimensionless
P population of receptors, dimensionless
Pmax peak overpressure, Pa or bar
Pr probit (in standard deviations)
Q fraction of population of receptors sustaining harm as de® ned by
a speci® ed quantal
Ri individual risk, s-
1
t time, s: t0, of arrival of pulse, t1, when intensity of pulse becomes
negligible
TD ! H dose-to-harm transform (an operator)
Greek letters
a attenuation factor, dimensionless
w ¯ ux: wE of energy (W m
- 2), wM of matter (kg s-
1 m- 2)





i referring to an individual receptor
I index (referring to customary expression of dose)
L level (of hazard realization)
M matter
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